According to Counterfactual Skepticism, we know next to none of the counterfactuals we assert in ordinary life. The most influential argument for this conclusion rests on premises that are now widely disputed. This talk outlines a new argument for Counterfactual Skepticism that does not depend on these controversial premises. 

However, unlike some, Joshua is not a skeptic and instead seeks the best ways to resist the view. A central fault line in the literature on counterfactuals concerns the status of the controversial principle ‘Conditional Excluded Middle’ (CEM). 

Two novel responses to the new argument for skepticism are sketched, each tailored to a side of this divide. The first—friendly to those who reject CEM—offers a sparse metaphysics at the cost of a revisionary logic for counterfactuals. The second—friendly to those who accept CEM—preserves a conservative logic at the cost of a bloated metaphysics. 

While Joshua leans toward the latter view, he is not fully decided on which option is best.

Joshua Pearson is interested in the interaction between belief, knowledge, conditionals, and probability. Much of his research is about how and when our full beliefs can be defeated by learning new information. He is currently examining the consequences of this research to determine how beliefs should relate to action and inquiry. He is also developing a project on counterfactuals that explores analogies to his work on defeat.