This project explores how U.S. nuclear arms control diplomacy with nuclear-armed adversaries—such as Russia and China—affects the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence in the eyes of U.S. allies. Although arms control is widely viewed as a critical tool for managing nuclear risks between nuclear-armed states and strengthening deterrence, how allies would view Washington’s nuclear arms control diplomacy has received limited scholarly attention. Yet historical records suggest that U.S. allies viewed arms control negotiations as having critical implications for their security, as these negotiations could influence the balance of nuclear forces and even the broader political relationship between the United States and its adversaries. To address this gap, I draw on theories of nuclear deterrence, interstate signaling, and great power statecraft to develop testable hypotheses on how different types of arms control agreements influence allied perceptions of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. I then test these hypotheses using cross-national survey experiments conducted in U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. This project sheds light on how arms control efforts may either bolster or undermine alliance assurance and inform policymakers on the potential implications of nuclear arms control diplomacy for alliance management.

Kyungwon Suh is a Senior Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He received a PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University in 2022. His research interests include nuclear weapons, interstate coercion, alliance politics, and great power competition. His research has been published in the Journal of Peace Research, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, European Journal of International Relations, and International Interactions.

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